Power behind the scenes: The importance of informal space in legislatures by Norton, Philip
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Parliamentary Affairs 




POWER BEHIND THE SCENES: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMAL SPACE IN LEGISLATURES1 
 
 
Studies of legislatures focus on what happens in formal space, principally the chamber and 
committee rooms.  Such studies are necessary, but not sufficient, for explaining behaviour 
within legislatures and its consequences.  The use of space for member to interact informally 
with one another – informal space – can contribute to the institutionalisation of a legislature 
through facilitating autonomy.  Such space provides an arena for socialisation, information 
exchange, lobbying, and mobilising political support.  This paper examines the significance of 
informal space, drawing on the experience of the UK Parliament. 
 
KEY WORDS: information exchange, institutionalisation, legislatures, lobbying, mobilising 
political support, informal space, UK Parliament 
 
 
Legislatures are typically multi-functional and functionally adaptable bodies, fulfilling a 
range of functions beyond their core defining function of giving assent to measures of public 
policy in order for them to be binding (Packenham 1970, Mezey 1979, Norton 1990).  The 
fulfilment of a legislature’s functions, or tasks, depends on the behaviour of members.  
Behavioural analysis has been a significant feature of political science.  The behaviour 
studied has predominantly been observable and empirically testable (Sanders 1995: 58).   
Behavioural analysis has been a notable feature of legislative studies, especially in the USA, 
from the 1950s onwards (Fiorina and Rohde 1989: 1-15; see also Hirsch and Hancock 1971).  
What members of legislatures say in debate, how they vote (in roll call votes), what 
amendments or bills they promote, are usually matters of record and are quantifiable.  Even 
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meetings that are private, such as of parliamentary party groups, may lend themselves to some 
measure of empirical analysis as a result of minutes, leaks, interviews or informal note-taking.   
 
The behaviour that is being analysed occurs within a particular physical space, what we term 
formal space.  By this, we mean space used for specified meetings, with a presiding officer, 
an agenda and behaviour governed by rules and procedures.  It thus encompasses the chamber 
and committee sessions.  It also includes space used for gatherings of parliamentary party 
groups, cross-party groups, and caucuses.  Such groups generally have scheduled meetings, 
may maintain minutes or some record of proceedings, and have officers, with these officers 
having some recognition for parliamentary and party purposes (see, e.g., Goodhart 1973, 
Heidar and Koole 2000, Norton 1995, 2013a).  We also include gatherings such as private 
dining groups and organised factions, given that they generally meet at specified times and 
are confined to an invited and exclusive group, with officers or a convenor (for the UK, see 
Grant 2010).  The activity by definition is collective activity.  
 
None of the characteristics of formal space applies in the context of informal space.  By this, 
we mean space where members gather and converse, but where the gathering is not formally 
scheduled, has no set agenda, is not minuted, and there is no-one presiding formally over 
proceedings.  As we are taking informal space as the obverse of formal space in legislatures, 
our focus is the use of such space by members within the legislature. Members may meet 
people outside the legislature, and indeed staff within, for formal (that is, scheduled and 
recorded) meetings as well as informal.  Here our concern is purely the functions (which we 
define, following Packenham, as consequences) of the use of space within an institution for 
informal discourse between members of that institution.  As formal space is usually where 
members meet physically, we confine our immediate study to physical space where members 
meet.  Although some parliamentary bodies may engage in online consultations, and employ 
the Internet for circulating papers, there is little use made of it for formal discourse purely 
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between members.  Its use for informal contact between members is, as we shall discuss later, 
an area for further research, but falls outside the remit of this analysis. 
 
By its nature, informal activity is difficult to measure.  As Dexter recalled of information 
influencing members of Congress on a particular policy, ‘the influence of other congressmen 
is very important, but frequently this is exerted in a casual, unplanned way, so it is not 
recognized or remembered except in the clear-cut cases’ (Dexter 1971: 38). Insofar as 
outcomes are affected by informal discourse between members, the impact of activity in such 
space resembles Bertrand Russell’s ‘power behind the scenes’ (Russell 1938: 33).  The power 
that is being exercised is influence rather than coercion (see Lukes 2005: 36; Norton 2013: 5) 
and the behaviour diffuse and unstructured, taking place usually away from public 
observation.  For the researcher, if not the legislator, it is largely hidden behaviour.   
 
This may explain why the use made of informal space is the orphan of legislative studies.  
According to Bell, ‘the theorist must attempt to systematise in an economical way what is 
“going on” in legislatures’ (Bell 1971).  There is a substantial body of path-breaking research 
that seeks to explain what is ‘going on’ (for an early anthology, see Hirsch and Hancock 1971 
and, for more recent work, Norton 1998), but it is largely silent on how parliamentarians 
interact informally.  The focus has tended to be on background, behaviour in public space, 
and the roles of members. White’s classic work on the US Senate, Citadel (1956), covered 
these, as well as how Senators saw themselves and what they sought to achieve, but without 
discussing the informal intercourse at the heart of the ‘inner club’.  Subsequent works have 
examined the importance of learning norms (Asher 1973, Crowe 1983, Loewenberg and 
Mans 1988), Uslaner (1993) doing so in terms of comity (a set of norms that include courtesy 
and reciprocity) and its decline in the US Congress.  Others have addressed how members see 
their roles (Wahlke et al. 1962, Fenno, 1978, Parker and Davidson 1979, Searing 1994; see 
also Andeweg 2014).  There has also been seminal scholarship emphasising rules and 
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procedures and how they shape behaviour (e.g. Shepsle 1978, Shepsle and Weingast 1984, 
1987, Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989, Krehbiel 1989, 1991; see also Műller and Sieberer 2014).  
Casting our net somewhat wider, to the whole sub-field, the most recent compendium, The 
Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies (Martin, Saalfeld and Strøm 2014), identifies and 
assesses much of the substantial literature on legislatures.  The literature is extensive, 
variously cutting edge, but there remains a lacuna.  What has been missing has been a study 
of the use made of space for informal gatherings of members.  Even Uslaner, in addressing 
courtesy and reciprocity, makes virtually no mention of it.   
 
The literature that has proved most relevant for our purposes derives not from behavioural 
analysis, but rather that identifying the importance of place, design and architecture (Flinders 
et al., 2018, McCarthy-Cotter et al., 2018, Norton 2017, Parkinson 2012, Goodsell 1988).  As 
Flinders, Cotter, Kelso and Meakin have argued in the context of the United Kingdom, 
‘architecture and design matter because the Palace of Westminster was explicitly designed to 
embed a very specific type of politics’ (Flinders et al., 2018: 149).  Space within legislatures 
is not distributed randomly.  It is the product of political choice.  These studies provide a 
valuable context for understanding the importance of space and its configuration within 
legislatures.  They help focus attention on how and why it exists.  Our study addresses how 
particular space is utilised. 
 
The use of informal space, we argue, is important to the legislature for the process of 
institutionalisation and, to members, for socialisation into the institution, for information 
exchange, for lobbying, and for mobilising political support.  Institutionalisation and the 
socialisation of members underpin the stability of the legislature.  Information exchange and 
lobbying can impact on ministerial actions and outcomes of public policy.  Mobilising 
political support can determine who holds office.  These are hardly insubstantial 
consequences. 
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Given the absence of scholarly research, our methodology is essentially one of social 
anthropology, utilising participant observation, drawing on the recollections of MPs and 
former MPs from interviews,2 diaries and memoirs, and by observation derived from the 
author’s immersion in parliamentary life over two decades.  Our aim is to establish that there 
is a gap, a significant, gap in the study of what is ‘going on’ within legislatures.  We employ 
the term ‘gap’ in two senses.  One is in indicating there is something missing, in this case in 
the academic literature.  The other is in denoting a space between two sides: in this case, 
academics and practitioners.  Whereas the use of informal space has not engaged notable 
academic attention, practitioners – certainly in the UK – have long been aware of its 
significance.   
 
Given the absence of previous studies that provide empirical analysis of the actual use of 
informal space, this is essentially the first step towards partially filling the gap.  As we shall 
conclude, there is scope for more extensive analysis of the use of informal space by 
legislators.  How design and changes in configuration of space shape behaviour is a 




The use of space for informal contact is a component, albeit largely neglected, in the 
institutionalisation of a legislature.  Such space is likely to be at a premium in democratic 
polities, with legislatures meeting on a regular basis.  Legislatures in authoritarian regimes 
typically have limited meeting times and hence limited time for informal gatherings of 
members.  The opportunity to meet may in any event be constricted by the absence of space 
for such informal intercourse.  There is no incentive for the regime to create such space. 
 
In legislatures in democratic systems, there will, typically, be space designed for members to 
meet informally with one another.  This will include dining, tea and reading rooms, and 
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possibly even sporting facilities.  Charles Clapp recorded in his classic study of members of 
the US Congress in the 1960s that ‘Participants emphasized the value of informal contacts 
such as the gym and playing cards provide’ (Clapp 1964: 16).  Both chambers of Congress 
have notable space in the form of cloakrooms, used now principally for monitoring business 
and dealing with inquiries, but ‘historically have been used for whispered conversations off 
the floor of the chamber’ (New York Times, 21 Jan. 1986).  The House Democratic 
Cloakroom, according to its own website, ‘provides Members the ability to converse, relax, 
discuss legislative strategy, or prepare for Floor business’ 
(https://democraticcloakroom.house.gov/about).  In the United Kingdom, there is space 
within the Palace of Westminster that has been, and is, exclusive to or occupied primarily by 
members.  As one leading text on Parliament observed, ‘From the start the clublike rooms and 
common spaces of Barry’s Palace have encouraged members of both Houses to congregate 
and meet informally.  In the Commons, the Smoking Room…, the Tea Room and the 
Members’ Lobby after a big vote (as well as the division lobbies themselves during it) are 
places where opinions are formed and exchanged, support is canvassed and tactics planned’ 
(Rogers and Walters 2015: 11-12.) 
 
These spaces have been, and remain, important for informal political discourse.  As such, the 
use of such space facilitates autonomy, differentiating the institution from the wider 
environment, a key feature of institutionalisation (Polsby 1968: 145; Patterson 1995: 16).  Its 
use may serve also to dissipate the capacity of an external force (such as a party leadership) to 
determine outcomes.  In some systems, where hierarchy rather than bargaining characterises 
the relationship between the leadership and party members (Cooper and Brady 1981), the 
strength of party overrides formal constitutional barriers between legislature and the 
executive, enabling the party leadership, wherever located, to issue instructions to party 
members in the legislature.  Indeed, this is a common, and longstanding, characteristic of 
parliamentary systems and, indeed, many presidential systems.  The ‘principle of Parliament’, 
declared Bagehot, ‘is obedience to leaders’ (Bagehot 1963: 158; first pub. 1867).  However, 
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the conduit through which instructions flow may be subject to leakage as result of interactions 
in informal space.  Leadership decisions may be questioned in informal gatherings of 
members, giving rise to resistance or even refusal to comply, initial conversations tapping 
concerns that are taken up by other members.   
 
The use of such space may also, though, help integrate party leaderships in the institution.  As 
we shall see, informal space provides members with opportunities to exchange information 
and also to lobby other members.  The space may also be used by party leaders, or their 
surrogates, for the same purposes, enabling them to know what is happening and to mobilise 
support for particular policies or even to maintain their own positions.  The use of informal 
space may thus serve to reinforce other characteristics of institutionalisation, not least 
complexity (Polsby 1968: 145, 153-60; Patterson 1995), embedding modes of behaviour and 
hence adding to the complex of interactions between members over and above those in 
chamber and committee deliberations.  Its use also reinforces the distinctiveness and stability 
of the legislature.  The contours and domain of informal space may provide members with a 
sense of ownership of that space, particularly where it is exclusive to members, and provide 
an established framework for private discussion.  Having that space available underpins the 
utility of the institution.  
 
Consequences for members 
 
The value of space for informal gatherings for members was neatly encompassed in the 
advice given by one British MP to new members of the House of Commons:  
 
… locate the leisure facilities, which is the safest description of the tea room, for 
Labour Members; the smoking room, for Conservatives; the bar, formerly SNP 
[Scottish National Party] territory….  All these, but particularly the tea room, serve as 
the great gossip exchange...  Members put this in romantic terms: ‘the walls of 
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Parliament have ears and the stones speak’, which may be true, but the tongues are 
human and they mainly wag in the tea and smoking rooms and the House’s nine bars. 
(Mitchell 1982: 59) 
 
The advice neatly encompasses various consequences of such space.  Our purpose here is to 
identify the principal consequences.  We draw on the experience of the UK Parliament to 




Socialisation is the process by which a person becomes acclimatised to an environment, 
especially the culture, that is, the norms and values of the body. Newcomers may learn the 
ways through contact with existing members and/or through observation.  As one British MP 
observed of the House of Commons, ‘the best basis for effective action is to absorb through 
the pores of the skin the way the House works and how to operate according to custom and 
practice’ (Holland 1988: 47).   The process may be a speedy one.  As Richard Fenno 
recorded, ‘Not only must the newcomer absorb a multitude of lessons, he must learn them 
quickly – especially if he aspires to become influential in the chamber’ (Fenno 1971: 130; see 
also Asher 1973).  Some may arrive having experienced some degree of prior socialisation 
(see Best and Vogel 2014: 60), through activity in a political party and through some 
experience of the institution.  Once members, they can then fit in much sooner than if they 
were complete strangers.  The most significant challenge tends not to be adapting to party 
norms and expectations, but to the social and procedural norms of the institution (Norton 
2016a: 187-8). 
 
The process by which parliamentarians are socialised has been the subject of various studies, 
foremost among them in the context of Westminster parliaments Docherty (1997) and Rush 
and Giddings (2011).  Crewe has also undertaken an anthropological study of both the British 
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House of Lords (2005) and House of Commons (2015).  What is notable about such works is 
the extent to which they focus on the formal activities of each House and how members learn 
about that activity, not least through induction processes arranged by party or House 
authorities (Rush and Giddings 2011, Ch. 4.  See also Lewis and Coghill 2016 and, for the 
USA, Price 1992: 31-2).  The other focus has tended to be learning through practice, 
examining primarily activity in formal space, such as asking questions and taking part in other 
proceedings.    
 
We know from existing studies how new members learn from longer-serving members, but 
that encompasses not just watching how existing members operate in formal space – speaking 
in the chamber, moving amendments in committee – but also through engaging with them in 
the privacy of dining and tea rooms.  Part of that engagement may be passive (‘a splendid 
place to get to know colleagues and discuss events’; Waddington 2012: 74), but may also be 
more proactive, through seeking out fellow members as guides and mentors (Rosenblatt 2006, 
Rush and Giddings 2011; see also Dickinson 2017).  The interaction has not necessarily been 
between new and longer-serving members.  In some parliaments, cohorts of newly elected 
members have tended to stick together (Norton 2016a: 194-5).  Indeed, the origins of the 
Conservative Party’s 1922 Committee, in effect the Conservative parliamentary party, lay in 
some Tory MPs newly elected in 1922 getting together to acclimatise themselves to the 
House through forming what amounted to a self-help group (Norton 2013a: 6).  
 
The use of informal space may serve to reinforce hierarchical and tribal norms.  How does 
one fit in with other members, not least those of some seniority?  Social norms help establish 
and consolidate hierarchy.  Tony Banks recounts the experience of two new Conservative 
MPs, Sebastian Coe and Gyles Brandreth, who went into the Members’ Dining Room, saw an 
empty table in the otherwise packed room and sat themselves at it, despite being conscious 
that other Members were staring at them: 
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the head waiter approached at a stately pace… ‘Good evening, gentlemen, ‘he said.   
‘Seeing as you are sharing his table, I assume you will be dining with the Chief Whip 
and his party this evening?’  The walk back through the crowded tables seemed to last 
a lifetime…’ (Banks 1993: 31) 
 
How informal space is configured may reflect and reinforce not only hierarchy, but also tribal 
attachments.  In the US Congress, each party in the House and Senate has its own cloakroom.  
In the UK Parliament, the use of space for informal discourse differs between the two Houses.  
MPs, unlike Lords, normally dine on a party basis, so there is little interaction between 
members of different parties.  ‘In the Members’ Dining-room, strict segregation is the order 
of the day: Tories at one end, Socialists at the other, with the clerks and the rest in the 
middle…  In the Tea Room also… ideologically sound soul-mates tend to stick together’ 
(Edmonds 1989: 20-1).  Members of the House of Lords, in contrast, employ what is known 
as the ‘long table’ principle: peers dining on their own join others sat at a long dining table, 
with party being irrelevant.  Even when not dining alone, there is a degree of fluidity as to 
dining companions.  There are problems in proving a causal relationship, but the practice in 
the Commons may be taken to reinforce the adversarial nature of the House.   
 
The use of informal space may serve also to socialise women into the legislature, countering 
the male-dominated norms that characterise formal space.  Some of the women MPs first 
returned in 1997 who were interviewed by Childs did not feel comfortable in the chamber, 
which, in the words of one, provides an ‘institutional framework that demands performance, 
that demands adversarial conflict’ (Childs 2004: 9).  Though some women MPs have been 
able to adapt to a ‘male’ style of politics, others have found it uncomfortable and chosen not 
to engage fully with the chamber.  Childs queried whether the House of Commons provided a 
‘safe space’ for women (Childs 2004: 8).  Although some informal space has served to 
reinforce the male nature of Westminster (in the past, some women MPs ‘found it difficult to 
stroll into the smoking room… unless they were invited in by a male colleague’; Phillips 
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1980: 172; see also Ridge 2017: 133), it has served also to provide safe or at least safer space 
than formal space, not least in the form of dedicated women’s rooms in both Houses.  
(Women MPs were first provided with a room in 1929; see Honeyball 2015: 131.)  Indeed, in 
the 1960s, when MPs had difficulty finding desks, the few women MPs elected had not only 
their own space, but could also utilise desks in the Lady Members’ Room (Knight 1995: 52-3; 
though on the use of dedicated rooms, see also Vallance 1979: 110-11), though later it could 
become crowded (Ridge 2017: 133).  Women may find the use of informal space less 
challenging, certainly less confrontational, than the use of formal space.  It facilitates working 




For members, informal space can be valuable for finding out what is going on and for 
exchanging views with fellow members.  The tea rooms and bars of the House of Commons 
are, in the words of one Member, ‘a launderette for information exchange’ (Mitchell 1982: 
60).  As in the Members’ dining room, MPs in the House of Commons sit in the tea room on a 
party basis, so one is generally sharing information with other party members.   
 
One MP described the tea room in the Commons as the  
 
archetypal venue for the hatching of plots; the starting post for those famous 
‘murmurings of backbench discontent’.  MPs feel safe here.  Away from staff, 
journos and members of the public, they can gripe away happily to their heart’s 
content, in the sure knowledge that they can be as indiscreet as they like.  (Banks 
1993: 129) 
 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Parliamentary Affairs 
following peer review. The version of record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsy018. 
 12 
As such, it is a useful source of intelligence as to the mood of members.  Given that, it attracts 
ministers, whips, and ministers’ parliamentary private secretaries (PPSs), unpaid assistants 
who act as an additional set of eyes and ears. 
 
Ministers… are often seen in the Tea Room gauging the ‘mood of the Party’ 
(Needham 1983: 78).  
 
The clamour for whips to get information knew no bounds.  They would attend all 
committee meetings, patrol the bars, sit in the Tea Room and strategically plonk 
themselves in the Members’ dining room (Hayes 2014: 153; see also Renton 2004: 
23). 
 
A favourite place for the PPSs of the Party Leaders to ‘take soundings’, ie find out 
what people are saying about the boss.  Very occasionally the boss will sally forth.  
(Banks 1993: 129) 
 
We shall return to the importance of ‘the boss’ – that is, the party leader – sallying forth.  For 
the moment, the key point is the use made of informal space by ministers, whips and PPSs to 
acquire information about the mood and views of members.  If there is discontent with a 
particular policy, or with the general direction being taken by the party, this will often find its 
outlet in the informal space where members gather.  As two former clerks observed, 
‘informality and personal contact… produces volatility: rumours travel quickly, even through 
so large a membership; views – and perhaps backbench rebellions – can gather momentum 
with surprising speed’ (Rogers and Walters 2015: 12).   
 
During a particularly difficult time for the Conservative Government of John Major in April 
1993, one Tory MP recorded in his diary, ‘There’s a scratchy atmosphere in the tea room.  
When they are not grumbling about the Chancellor and VAT on fuel, they’re muttering about 
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[Education Secretary] John Patten’s classroom tests’ (Brandreth 1999: 168).  Such 
grumblings can fester into serious discontent.  As the same MP recorded the following 
January:  ‘I have just returned from the smoking room.  The Right think it’s a shambles, the 
Left think it’s a pantomime’ (Brandreth 1999: 232).   A year after Gordon Brown became 
Prime Minister, Chris Mullin reported: ‘In the Tea Room, open talk of insurrection, mainly 
but not entirely from the Usual Suspects.  The difference is that they no longer trouble to 
lower their voices’ (Mullin 2009: 242).  
 
At times of crisis for a party, including when there is pressure for a party leader to go, 
informal space can complement or supersede the chamber as the place to be.  At the end of 
the dramatic first day’s debate in May 1940 on the wartime conduct of the government – 
leading to the downfall of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain – Members ‘gathered in the 
smoking room and bars and nooks and crannies of the House of Commons.  They stayed for 
many hours to rehash and rethink and resolve their plans’ (Schneer 2015: 17).  One Labour 
MP recorded the scenes in 2002 when there was a particular crisis for the Conservatives under 
their leader Iain Duncan Smith: ‘Tories are gathering in the corridors and lobbies in earnest 
little groups which go quiet whenever someone from another party approaches…  Meanwhile, 
the Tories have practically abandoned the chamber’ (Mullin 2009: 324).  For those wanting to 
know what MPs think, and plan to do, spending time in the tea room, smoking room and other 
social spaces is thus necessary. 
 
Whips monitor and report back any discontent: ‘I reported to the Chief [Whip] that there was 
much muttering in the Smoking Room about some business on the Order Paper.  There were 
rumours of a rebellion and the possibility of a government defeat’ (Waddington 2012: 108).  
The information, according to one Chief Whip, is all fed back and discussed by the whips 
collectively while the House is sitting (Renton: 2004: 23).  PPSs are keen to find out how 
their ministers are viewed by backbenchers and whether any action is needed to head off 
growing disquiet.  This can be especially important for the Prime Minister’s PPS, for whom 
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spending time in informal space complements attending the weekly meeting of the 
parliamentary party in order to assess the mood of the party.  Tony Blair as Prime Minister 
may not have spent much time in the tea and dining rooms, but his PPS, Bruce Grocott, 
certainly did, regarding it as an essential part of his role.  It was also a means of knowing how 
others in the party were regarded.  He would be present when the PM was contemplating a 
change of ministers and, drawing on his knowledge of the standing of those being considered 
for promotion, applied his ‘reshuffle test’: if the person died, how many MPs would turn up to 
the funeral?  (Lord Grocott to author).  
 
Conversely, PPSs use the space to keep members informed of their ministers’ ‘plans, 
reactions and hopes’ (Renton 2004: 73) as well as address any concerns.  The ministers may    
seek personally to persuade doubters.  One Labour Cabinet minister, Jack Straw, renowned 
for negotiating with backbenchers, was described by one MP as ‘the senior minister most 
often in the tea room’ (Cowley 2005: 68).  Whereas space for informal discourse in 
Congressional cloakrooms is confined to members and staff, the separation-of-powers 
ensuring that members of the executive are excluded, in Parliament there is interaction 
between backbench members and members of the executive.  In such space, ministers may be 
prepared to share confidences they would not be willing to share in formal space. 
 
The presence of ministers may also extend beyond exchanging information to fulfilling a 
safety valve function.  Space used for informal gatherings may be a breeding ground for 
discontent, but the presence of ministers may also serve to absorb it.  If ministers are prepared 
to listen, members with grievances may feel it is sufficient to know that they have been heard 
and not take their grievances as far as abstaining or voting against the party line (former 
Cabinet minister to author).  When issues generating backbench unease are being pursued, the 
whips are keen to encourage ministers to spend time in the tea room (former Deputy Chief 
Whip to author).  For ministers, spending time in such space may be a prudent investment. 
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There can be a more proactive side to employing informal space, namely to see backbench 
members, or for those members to see ministers, to encourage them to support a particular 
policy or political action.  Members may call to see colleagues in their offices or may simply 
position themselves in areas where members gather in order to persuade them to sign up to 
their campaign.  Those who are not members may also arrange to meet and to lobby 
parliamentarians in public or private parts of the legislature.  
 
If a backbench MP wants to lobby a minister to take some particular action, the way to do it is 
not to confront the minister publicly.  ‘What you can do is to take him to one side, have a 
drink with him or a meal with him, talk to him in the Lobby. Give him the idea, persuade him, 
let him promote it as his idea’ (Sir Richard Body MP, quoted in Mitchell 1982: 63; see also 
Rose 1981: 89).  One of the arguments for retaining the method of voting in person in 
division lobbies (rather than electronically) has been that it brings ministers in and provides 
other members with an opportunity to lobby them. ‘It is’, as Labour MP Linda Gilroy 
recounted, ‘a great opportunity to meet Ministers to talk with them’ (McDougall 1998: 173).  
A particular prize is the Prime Minister.  ‘Once the Prime Minister is inside and the doors are 
locked you can touch his arm or, in extremis, grab him by the throat and tell him what you 
think.  There’s no hiding place even for the PM in lobbies’ (Sedgemore 1995: 54).  When 
Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister and there was a division in which she participated, 
queues used to form of backbench MPs wanting to see her (former Deputy Chief Whip to 
author).    
 
Corridors supplement the division lobbies as sites for lobbying.  Chance, or not so chance, 
encounters can produce results.  Some campaigning members are adept at using such informal 
opportunities.  They typically use such space to complement asking questions or raising 
issues in debate.  ‘Any new MP has got to realise that he doesn’t alter anything just by tabling 
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a motion or asking a question.  He’s got to work at it.  He’s got to talk to them in the tea 
room’ (George Cunningham MP, quoted in Mitchell 1982: 62).   
 
 In the inter-war years, one Independent MP, Eleanor Rathbone – described by one biographer 
as the most important women politician in Britain in the first half of the 20th Century 
(Pedersen 2004) – was variously successful in achieving policy changes (Stocks 1949, Alberti 
1996, Pedersen 2004, Norton 2016b).  She utilised formal space, but was also notably 
effective in using informal space.  She would pace the corridors of the Palace of Westminster, 
weighed down with papers related to her campaigns, and waylay ministers, who came to treat 
her advancing figure with some trepidation (Nicolson 1946; see Norton 2016b: 7).  She would 
persist until she got her way.   
 
Some members can be persistent, in some cases a little too persistent, in lobbying ministers 
and fellow members, whereas others are more selective.  Rathbone complemented her own 
direct lobbying – which she recognised could sometimes put ministers off – by persuading 
some of her supporters to pursue ministers on her behalf.   
 
Ministers too can utilise the space.  Indeed, at times the lobbying may be as much from a 
minister as a backbencher.  One new MP recalled the occasion when ‘Peter [Walker, housing 
minister]…  caught up with me in the Division Lobby and encouraged me to put pressure on 
him to allow discounted sales of new-town authority houses’ (Tebbit 1989: 124).  Labour MP 
Chris Mullin recalled Justice Secretary Jack Straw seeing him in the tea room ‘to bend his 
ear’ to support the Government’s policy of pre-charge detention (Mullin 2010: 250). 
Lobbying can be a two-way process. 
 
Lobbying can result in ministers accepting particular proposals or in them amending or 
withdrawing existing ones.  Letting a minister ‘promote it as his idea’ may facilitate getting it 
accepted, but means that in its public presentation its genesis may be hidden.  It may also be 
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difficult to isolate the effect of lobbying in informal space from that in public space, in the 
form of questions and debates.  Lobbying a minister in the tea room or lobbies may be a 
contributory element or it may be crucial in tipping the balance in favour of the proposal.  
What is apparent is that members regard space for informal intercourse as a valuable arena for 
lobbying.  It thus shapes their behaviour.  That applies to ministers as well as backbenchers. 
 
Mobilising political support 
 
Informal space also constitutes a valuable arena in which to mobilise support for one’s own 
position.  It can be used protectively, to maintain support, or proactively for the purpose of 
career advancement.  In the words of one former Cabinet minister ‘there is no substitute for 
ensuring that you meet regularly with your own parliamentary colleagues… When the going 
gets rough these are the people who can help you through a crisis in one piece’ (Hutton and 
Lewis 2014: 149).  As Emma Crewe recounted:  
 
MPs told me that working the tearoom to nurture your relationships with your 
colleagues, and maybe even converting your critics once in a blue moon, is useful to 
any Minister.  Those who don’t find the time to do this, or keep away because they 
don’t relish Parliament’s strange eating places, may be vulnerable when in trouble or 
as a reshuffle or election approaches (Crewe 2015: 121) 
 
The value to ministers was recorded by one Tory MP, who, in a meeting with a minister he 
anticipated would run into trouble on a particular policy, advised him to spend time in the tea 
room:  ‘increasingly, he’s out of touch.  Howard, Portillo, Lilley [Cabinet ministers], they 
work the tea room.  Howard told me he eats in the dining room at least once a week “without 
fail – you must”’ (Brandreth 1999: 249). 
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This can apply not only to senior ministers, but also to the most senior.  Candidates for a party 
leadership may stalk the tea rooms and dining rooms to solicit support from fellow members.  
Leaders wishing to maintain their position do likewise.  Prime Ministers neglect informal  
space of Parliament at their peril.  Given their schedules, finding time to utilise informal space 
can be a challenge.  ‘Prime Ministers have to be very determined to find time to drop into the 
Tea Room of the House, to walk over to Party headquarters or to invite a few colleagues and 
their wives to dinner or the theatre’  (Baker: 1993: 389).  Political imperatives may mean that 
some do make the effort.  Some have used it to effect.  Prime Minister James (Jim) Callaghan, 
heading a minority government (1976-9), was keen to keep minor parties on side.  One MP 
reported a conversation with Callaghan’s Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees:  ‘he told me how he 
and Jim used to patrol the Tea Room and bars and “give the boys what they wanted”.  So 
Plaid Cymru got their own TV channel in Welsh, and the Northern Ireland and Scots 
nationalists got a few gerrymandered seats’ (Hayes 2014: 125).  This may be an exaggeration 
– concessions were made as part of negotiations (Callaghan 1988: 452-3), but the calling of 
the 1979 general election prevented the pledge to Plaid Cymru being implemented by the 
Callaghan Government – but it reflects the significance ascribed by senior figures to informal 
space. 
 
Courting MPs in such space can deliver benefits.  Neglecting it can have significant political 
costs.  Some Prime Ministers have made infrequent use of the space and it has been obvious 
when they make rare appearances.  Clement Attlee made a few and largely unfruitful forays 
into the tea and smoking rooms following an ‘Attlee must go’ campaign (Driberg 1988: 93-4).  
Neglect of such space was viewed by many Tory MPs as having contributed to two 
Conservative party leaders losing their party leadership and in one case, consequently, the 
premiership. 
 
Edward Heath’s loss of the Conservative party leadership in 1975 was in part attributed to his 
failure to utilise informal space.  He was not prone to socialise with backbench MPs and 
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encounters with them in the tea or dining rooms were awkward.  As one MP recalled, 
reflecting on the 1975 leadership campaign: ‘His rather rare visits to the Members’ smoking 
room were unrewarding because, as a friend of his put it to me, he could not talk about 
unimportant things to unimportant people.  It bored and embarrassed him’ (Fisher 1977: 166).  
In the recollection of one of Heath’s Cabinet colleagues:  
 
At one point I advised Ted to spend more time in the smoking room since MPs were 
seeing too little of him as Prime Minister.  I went into the smoking room a few days 
later to find that he had taken my advice and was talking to a distinguished Tory.  As 
I passed, I heard him say, “That was a dreadful speech you made last Wednesday” 
(Walker 1991: 120).   
 
For a leader, mishandling of informal space can be as bad as avoiding it.  Heath’s failure to 
use such space effectively was not the cause of his loss of the Conservative party leadership, 
but it was seen by supporters as a contributory factor.  It was not simply a feature of his 
campaign to be re-elected, but was symptomatic of his period as Prime Minister (Norton 
1978: 228-30; Clarke 2016: 88-9).  By the time of the leadership election, following two 
general election losses, Heath’s failure to communicate with his backbenchers meant he had 
no significant body of goodwill on which he could draw.  He was vulnerable by the time the 
leadership election was triggered. 
 
He was replaced as party leader by Margaret Thatcher, who was determined not to repeat his 
mistakes, but once ensconced in Downing Street in 1979 she too tended to neglect the places 
in which MPs gathered.  She would occasionally descend on unsuspecting Conservative 
Members when trouble loomed.  ‘She is even known to visit the Tea Room when rumblings 
of backbench rebellion percolate as far as Number 10 and potential poll-tax and social-
security-cuts refuseniks have been made to feel very uncomfortable’ (Edmonds 1989: 21).  
Such behaviour, though, was reactive, a sign of panic rather than part of regular activity to 
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maintain support.  As one MP noted, her appearance ‘just prior to her departure in 1990, was 
a rare sighting, and a sign of panic’ (Banks 1993: 129).   
 
Thatcher was challenged for the party leadership in 1990 and failed to get the requisite 
number of votes for victory in the first leadership ballot against her challenger, Michael 
Heseltine.  The extent to which informal space was significant in Thatcher’s loss was clear 
from the recollections of former Cabinet minister and Conservative Party chairman, Kenneth 
Baker.  He noted that Heseltine, having previously neglected the informal space of 
Westminster, now ‘haunted the place’: ‘I had never before seen him in the Tea Room, and he 
only went into the Smoking Room after he had made a successful speech.  He was rarely to be 
seen in the Dining Room.  But now he was everywhere...’ (Baker 1993: 390; see also 
Shepherd 1991: 22; Parkinson 1992: 25-6; Crick 1997: 348; Aitken 2013: 622-3).  After 
resigning the leadership, Thatcher told Baker ‘”You… told me that I would have to ring up 
MPs and spend time in the Tea Room.  That’s not for me after eleven years”...’ (Baker 1993: 
390).  When she did make the effort to visit the tea room, she realised the effect of her 
neglect:  ‘I had never experienced such an atmosphere before.  Repeatedly I heard: “Michael 
has asked me two or three times for my vote already.  This is the first time we have seen 
you”’ (Thatcher 1993: 850).  As Shepherd wrote of the campaign, ‘Tory backbenchers 
complained that “she hadn’t even been tearooming before the first ballot”’(Shepherd 1991: 
21). 
 
Heseltine’s invasion of informal space, and Thatcher’s neglect of it, was seen as significant 
given the narrowness of Thatcher’s failure to reach the required threshold in the first ballot.  
She was four votes short of the majority necessary to be declared re-elected.  According to 
one of her supporters, her failure to see Members ‘forfeited anywhere between ten and thirty 
vital votes’ (Aitken 2013: 624).  Had she spent time in the tea room rallying waverers, 
sufficient to sway two or three Heseltine-voting MPs to her cause, she would have carried the 
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day.  ‘Four votes, that was all there was in it….  For want of a nail a kingdom was lost’ (Clark 
1993: 358). 
 
Just as the use of space for informal gatherings was seen as a factor in the downfall of both 
Heath and Thatcher, it also figured prominently in the campaign of Thatcher’s successor, 
John Major.  Major knew the value of utilising informal space.  As his biographer noted, 
‘Major had been an assiduous House of Commons man from 1979 to 1990, an avid networker 
of Tea and Dining Rooms, a soaker-up of atmosphere in the chamber and committee 
rooms…’ (Seldon 1997: 211).  When he stood for the party leadership, his supporters utilised 
informal space to good effect.  As his campaign manager recalled, in addition to utilising the 
press and television, ‘canvassing went on hourly in the Smoking Room, the Tea Room, the 
corridors and the other parts of the House of Commons’ (Lamont: 1999: 24; see also 
Shepherd 1991: 75).  Major’s PPS, for example, during a division ‘was loitering at the near 
end of the “no” lobby, catching MPs as they passed’ (Major 1999: 192).  Although Major’s 
campaign team was put together quickly, it proved highly effective in utilising informal space 
and making sure supporters utilised it to monitor and to mobilise support.   
 
However, like his two predecessors, Major as party leader tended to neglect informal space.  
He became somewhat isolated from backbenchers at a time when the parliamentary party 
became notably restless, not least over the issue of European integration (Riddell 1994: 51-3; 
Baker, Gamble and Ludlam 1993: 151-66).  He did venture to the tea room to bolster support 
when he triggered a leadership contest in 1995 (Norton 1998: 101), but that was the exception 
rather than the norm.  ‘It is a surprise… that the House did not loom larger in his life as Prime 
Minister, and that he did not spend much time there picking up the mood’ (Seldon 1997: 211).  
As Anthony Seldon recorded, the neglect was puzzling, given that Major was well aware of 
the effect that neglecting informal space had for his predecessors.  ‘Lack of time must be the 
chief reason, although high office tends to distance its occupants’ (Seldon 1997: 211). 
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Space for informal discourse thus matters in that it can affect who holds office.  Ministers 
may devote time to maintaining support among backbenchers.  A failure to do so may render 
them vulnerable if they encounter a political crisis.  The shift of Conservative Party leadership 
from Edward Heath to Margaret Thatcher had significant consequences for British politics.  




The use of space for members meeting informally is an intrinsic part of parliamentary life, 
important to members for learning the rules and practices of the institution, for sharing 
information with colleagues, especially party colleagues, for gaining support for one’s causes, 
and for one’s own political advancement.  One cannot understand how Parliament operates 
with the use of informal space omitted from consideration.  Exploiting it effectively can 
deliver notable rewards.  Neglecting it can mean one fails to achieve one’s policy goals and to 
reach the top – or to stay at the top – of the political ladder.  
 
Informal space in legislatures thus merits serious analysis.  Our study provides an initial, 
indeed somewhat tentative, examination, adumbrating the functions fulfilled by the use of 
such space in the UK Parliament, principally the House of Commons.  There is scope for 
further research on its use for particular policy outcomes.  As we have noted in opening, a 
particularly rich seam for further study is the configuration of social space and the effects of 
change in that configuration.  In the UK Parliament, the opening in 2001 of a new building – 
Portcullis House, with a major social space at its heart and located at the intersection of 
several parliamentary buildings and the Palace of Westminster – transformed informal space.  
Further change in informal space will result from both Houses leaving the Palace of 
Westminster for several years during a programme of restoration and renewal of the Palace.  
The consequences have yet to be fully assessed, not least for informal discourse between 
members of both Houses.3  The use of informal space in a legislature may be affected not 
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only by physical changes with new or redesigned buildings, but also by a change in 
procedures (such as sitting hours) or members’ preferences.  There is thus the basis for 
examining the use of informal space as dynamic rather than fixed. 
 
We have confined our study to physical space.  Increasingly, informal space has expanded 
into virtual space, the use of social media, not least WhatsApp groups, complementing what 
goes on in tea rooms and lobbies.  Members may converse via social media, utilising it to 
exchange information or lobby support for a cause or their own advancement.  Whips and 
party managers may use it to keep members informed.  The extension of internal interactions 
into cyberspace has advantage for members – not only convenience in terms of timing, but 
also privacy, away from any prying eyes, not least of the whips or in some cases backbench 
colleagues – but has the disadvantage for scholars as well as whips in being even less 
observable than meetings in physical space.  Interaction via social media with constituents 
and others via Facebook, twitter and blogs can be monitored (see e.g. Jackson 2008, Jackson 
and Lilleker, 2009, 2011), but the interactions purely between members create problems for 
determining its extent and its effect.   
 
There is thus scope for examining not only changes in informal space over time, but also its 
expansion into cyberspace.  The other challenge is to extend the study beyond examining the 
dynamic in one nation to a more global perspective.  Our study is confined to the UK, but 
provides the framework for comparative analysis, examining the configuration of informal 
space in other legislatures, national and sub-national, and its use for informal discourse 
between members.  To what extent are the functions we have identified in the UK fulfilled 
elsewhere and with what effect?  Is the significance we have attached to them replicated 
elsewhere?   
 
We assume the use of informal space in legislature to have consequences wherever such 
space exists.  Where it exists, it merits study.  To date, that has what has been largely missing. 
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